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The SEC’s recent staff roundtable on the proxy process and its resulting
guidance, interpretation, and proposed rules has made shareholder voting
the most prominently debated corporate governance issue of recent times.
The number of comment letters submitted to the SEC has been voluminous
and includes eight submitted by this Article’s author. Yet, the author doubts
many of the writers of these letters, except in the context of their political
agendas, have really thought deeply about the role shareholder voting plays
in the governance of corporations, the collective action problem imbedded
in such voting (and how it needs to be managed), the inability of proxy
advisors to solve the collective action problem, the objective of shareholder
voting, and how and when shareholder voting creates value. This Article is
dedicated to filling the gap in the collective understanding of shareholder
voting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) recent staffroundtable on the proxy process1 has made shareholder voting themost prominently debated corporate governance issue of recent
times for three reasons: (1) the roundtable’s resulting guidance, interpre-
1. Public Statement, Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement
Announcing SEC Staff Roundtable on the Proxy Process (July 30, 2018), https://
www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-announcing-sec-staff-roundtable-proxy-pro-
cess [https://perma.cc/2EMP-G8ZH].
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tation, and proposed rules on limiting shareholder proposals,2 (2) its issu-
ance of a final rule on regulating proxy advisors (and the creation of
shareholder voting recommendations for investment advisers),3 and (3)
its guidance, which increased the fiduciary burden on investment advisers
to make sure that the voting recommendations provided by proxy advi-
sors are adequately informed and nonconflicted.4 The number of com-
ment letters submitted to the SEC has been voluminous and includes
eight submitted by this Article’s author.5 Yet, the author doubts that
many of the writers of these letters, except in the context of their political
agendas, have really thought deeply about the role played by shareholder
voting in the governance of corporations, the collective action problem
that is imbedded in such voting (and how it needs to be managed),6 the
inability of proxy advisors to solve the collective action problem,7 the ac-
tual objective of shareholder voting,8 and how and when shareholder vot-
ing creates value.9 This Article is dedicated to filling the gap in the
understanding of shareholder voting.
Shareholder voting provides a means by which shareholders can par-
ticipate in corporate decision making. As stated by Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fischel, “The right to vote is the right to make all decisions
not otherwise provided by contract—whether the contract is express or
supplied by legal rule.”10 Yet very few corporate decisions, especially in
the type of corporations this Article is focused on (publicly traded com-
panies taking the corporate form (public companies)), involve this deci-
sion-making mechanism. Shareholders do vote on major corporate
2. Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange Act
Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 34-87458, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,458 (proposed Dec. 4,
2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
3. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1(1), a-2, a-9 (2020).
4. Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment
Advisers, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-33605 (Sept. 10, 2019) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 271 (2020)); Commission Interpretation and Guidance Regarding the Applicabil-
ity of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86721(Sept.
10, 2019) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 241 (2020)); Supplement to Commission Guidance Re-
garding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 5547 (July 22, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 276 (2020)).
5. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMMENTS ON STATEMENT ANNOUNCING SEC
STAFF ROUNDTABLE ON THE PROXY PROCESS, https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4-
725.htm [https://perma.cc/QS8F-HZQB]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMMENTS ON PRO-
POSED RULE: PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND RESUBMISSION THRESHOLDS UNDER EX-
CHANGE ACT RULE 14A-8, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-23-19/s72319.htm [https://
perma.cc/TP7Y-8KZP]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE:
AMENDMENTS TO EXEMPTIONS FROM THE PROXY RULES FOR PROXY VOTING ADVICE,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-19/s72219.htm [https://perma.cc/EW7A-UY5Y]; see
also Jens Frankenreiter, Mapping the Landscape of Comments to the SECs New Proxy
Rules, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 4, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/03/
04/mapping-the-landscape-of-comments-to-the-secs-new-proxy-rules/ [https://perma.cc/
8SDU-45HF] (identifying the submission of over 500 comment letters).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 66 (1991).
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actions such as the election of corporate directors,11 merger agree-
ments,12 proxy contests,13 changes to the articles of incorporation,14 and
the election of directors at the annual meeting.15 However, while impor-
tant, these actions are extremely limited compared to the millions of deci-
sions made annually in a public company.
Such limited use of shareholder voting makes sense. Shareholder vot-
ing may be used for purposes other than shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion, the presumed default objective of corporate governance,16 and it is
notoriously uninformed even if the proxies are submitted by large institu-
tional investors.17 It may also lead the board of directors to make sub-
optimal decisions in order to preempt a shareholder vote on a share-
holder proposal or proxy contest if the board wants to avoid the risk of
losing the vote.18 If so, why is its use, although limited, so pervasive?19
Why not just have the board of directors, chief executive officers, and
company employees make all of the decisions and keep shareholders en-
tirely out of the decision-making process?
While these questions may seem out of step with today’s so-called
shareholder empowerment movement20 toward greater shareholder de-
mocracy and control, this was not always the case. In the 1950s and ‘60s,
leading legal scholars including Adolph Berle, Bayless Manning, and
Abram Chayes, along with management guru Peter Drucker, thought the
answer to these questions should lead to the end of shareholder voting.21
According to Henry Manne, “Most of the critics of the school of corpo-
rate democracy have taken issue with the basic suppositions that it is ap-
propriate for shareholders to make the decisions they do (including
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2020).
12. Id. § 251(c).
13. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -104 (2020).
14. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1).
15. Id. § 211(b).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. Kosmas Papadopoulos, An Overview of Vote Requirements at U.S. Meetings,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 6, 2019), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/06/an-overview-of-vote-requirements-at-u-s-meetings/
[https://perma.cc/67BG-8BE7].
20. Shareholder empowerment is strongly related to the concept of “shareholder de-
mocracy,” a term coined in the mid-1900s that “carried the normative message that greater
shareholder participation in corporate governance was both possible and desirable.” Har-
well Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the
Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1069 (2015). Shareholder democracy is cur-
rently associated with the idea of one-share, one-vote. See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive
Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1390
(2006); see also Bernard Sharfman, BlackRock, Larry Fink, and a New Form of Share-
holder Empowerment, REALCLEARMARKETS (May 8, 2020), https://www.realclearmarkets.
com/articles/2020/05/08/blackrock_larry_fink_and_a_new_form_of_shareholder_empower
ment_491105.html [https://perma.cc/T6RG-7CL3] (noting that “shareholder empower-
ment” is “the desire of certain shareholders for greater participation in corporate
governance”).
21. Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 399, 409 (1962).
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election of directors) and that they are capable of making intelligent
decisions.”22
This view persisted into at least the early 1980s. Easterbrook and Fis-
chel summarized the viewpoint of some academic scholars of that time:
Shareholders’ interests are protected not by voting but by the market
for stock (and the managers’ need to raise new capital), the market
for goods, and the market for managers’ services. It would make lit-
tle difference if shareholders, like bondholders, could not vote at all.
Funds spent providing shareholders with a more effective voice are
wasted at best and harmful beyond their costs if they hamper the
firms’ effective pursuit of profits. On this view it is a puzzle that
shareholders have, or exercise, votes.23
Nevertheless, this Article has no interest in resurrecting the argument
that shareholder voting must be eliminated in public companies simply
because it is arguably uninformed. Instead, even though it finds the share-
holder empowerment movement to be a hindrance to efficient corporate
decision making, and believes it should be curtailed, this Article will ar-
gue that it needs to continue—inefficiencies and all.
The textual foundation for this Article comes from the author’s De-
cember 20, 2019 comment letter to the SEC.24 In the process of writing
that letter, a letter that argued for the implementation of the SEC’s pro-
posed amendments to its rules for proxy voting advice, it became clear
that the letter was also an exploration of the pros and cons of shareholder
voting. This Article continues that exploration but in a much more com-
prehensive way.
References to state corporate law in the discussion that follows has
been pragmatically framed in the context of Delaware corporate law. The
vast majority of the largest U.S. companies are incorporated in Dela-
ware,25 and Delaware’s corporate law often serves as the authority that
other states look to when developing their own statutory and common
law.26 Therefore, the primary examples are from Delaware, but the think-
ing is meant to be global.
22. Id.
23. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 397 (1983).
24. Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-19/s72219-6571096-
201082.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJS-7TGR]. This comment letter was cited six times in the
final rule and discussed a fair amount in the text. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1(1), a-2, a-9
(2020).
25.  LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007) (stating
that Delaware is “the favored state of incorporation for U.S. businesses”). According to
the State of Delaware website, “More than 1,000,000 business entities have made Delaware
their legal home. More than 66% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal
home.” About the Division of Corporations, DEL. DIV. CORPS., http://corp.delaware.gov/
aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/3MQG-P67L].
26. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate
of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 397 (2007).
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Part II will describe the collective action problem that is at the heart of
shareholder voting and how it leads to uninformed voting. Part III will
discuss how the use of proxy advisors does not solve shareholder voting’s
collective action problem faced by institutional investors. Part IV ad-
dresses shareholder voting’s objective and why shareholder wealth max-
imization may not necessarily be its only, or even its primary, objective.
Part V will discuss how and when shareholder voting creates value. Part
VI discusses five specific implications of shareholder voting for the corpo-
rate governance of public companies, including the SEC’s recently imple-
mented rule changes for shareholder proposals.
II. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM IMBEDDED IN
SHAREHOLDER VOTING
“Shareholder voting suffers from a significant ‘collective action’ prob-
lem.”27 As a result, many voters are uninformed when they vote. Accord-
ing to Easterbrook and Fischel, “When many are entitled to vote, none of
the voters expects his votes to decide the contest. Consequently none of
the voters has the appropriate incentive at the margin to study the firm’s
affairs and vote intelligently.”28 Similarly, Paul Edelman, Randall
Thomas, and Robert Thompson found the following:
There is a serious collective action problem in shareholder voting:
the benefits of a successful vote accrue to all shareholders but the
costs of voting (for example, information acquisition, preparation
and distribution of materials, mustering support) are borne by each
voter separately so that shareholders may have inadequate incentives
to vote.29
As a result, when shareholders do not bother to become informed, or
don’t even vote, they are not considered irresponsible but rather “ration-
ally apathetic.”30
27. Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24. This collective action problem was noted in the proposed
amendments. Amendments to Exemptions From the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice,
Exchange Act Release No. 3235-AM50, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,518, 66,541–42 (Dec. 4, 2019) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (citing Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko, Proxy Advi-
sory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters, 74 J. FIN. 2441, 2442 (2019)
(“In this paper, we emphasize that the market efficiency view does not take into account
the collective action problem among shareholders. We show that because shareholders do
not internalize the effect of their actions on other shareholders, there may be excessive
overreliance on proxy advisors’ recommendations and, as a result, excessive conformity in
shareholders’ votes.” (emphasis added))).
28. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 402.
29. Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting
in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1379 (2014) (emphasis
added).
30. See generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 9.5.1, at 390–92
(1986) (discussing the rational apathy problem).
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A. THE IMPACT
Empirically, this collective action problem results in a low percentage
of retail investors casting their ballots at shareholder meetings. Based on
recent research by Alon Brav, Matthew Cain, and Jonathon Zytnick, re-
tail investors are not inclined to vote unless they own a significant per-
centage of the company’s stock or the company has experienced a recent
track record of poor financial performance. 31
The collective action problem also exists at the institutional investor
level but is manifested in a different way. As a result of SEC and Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) regulatory guidance that makes shareholder voting
a fiduciary duty, institutional investors such as investment advisers and
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) plan
managers now feel compelled to cast their ballots on almost all issues
presented for a vote at a public company.32 This has resulted in many
institutional investors being required to cast ballots by proxy on tens, if
not hundreds, of thousands of votes per year.33 However, because of the
collective action problem, the amount of resources they are willing to
spend on acquiring information, internally or externally, in order to be
adequately informed on each and every vote is minimal. This requires
them to seek the services of a low-cost proxy advisor for voting recom-
mendations such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Glass
Lewis.
B. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM AT PASSIVE AND ACTIVELY
MANAGED FUNDS
Consider how the collective action problem, and the regulatory pres-
sure to vote, encourages our largest investment advisers to index mutual
funds and exchange traded funds (BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street
Global Advisors, Fidelity, etc.) to adopt a low-cost approach to share-
holder voting. The management of passive funds exists in a supercompeti-
tive industry with extremely thin profit margins, providing investment
advisers with very little room to spend resources on shareholder voting.
Moreover, since the goal of an index fund is to meet, not beat, the mar-
31. Alon Brav, Matthew D. Cain & Jonathan Zytnick, Retail Shareholder Participation
in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/19/re
tail-shareholder-participation/ [https://perma.cc/6K25-ST8H] (“On the decision whether to
cast a ballot, we find that retail shareholders cast 32% of their shares, on average, which is
significantly lower than the 80% rate of participation by the entire shareholder base. In
total, 12% of the average firm’s retail accounts choose to vote. Retail voter participation is
higher among smaller firms. The decision to cast a ballot varies predictably with antici-
pated costs and benefits. It increases with stake size, when the company’s return on assets
is poor, and when there are ISS-opposed proposals on the ballot.”).
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See, e.g., VANGUARD, 2018 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 34
(2018), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/
2018_investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBH2-YPCD] (On a
global basis, Vanguard’s Investor Stewardship team “cast nearly 169,000 individual votes in
the 2018 proxy year.”).
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ket, the adviser would not derive any competitive benefit from receiving
highly informed and precise recommendations and, therefore, would
have no incentive to spend the money that the creation of such recom-
mendations would require.34
According to Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, when investor steward-
ship teams from the “Big Three” mutual fund families (Blackrock, Van-
guard, and State Street Global Advisors) provide voting
recommendations to their index fund clients, “their stewardship focuses
on governance structures and processes and pays limited attention to fi-
nancial underperformance.”35 This “mitigating governance risk” strategy
results in a significant economization of an investment advisors’ re-
sources. For example, BlackRock only has forty-five global professionals
in its investment stewardship team.36 This small group of professionals
manages tens of thousands of votes on an annual basis and all of Black-
Rock’s engagement with its portfolio companies on various matters.37 A
BlackRock manager’s description of her workload epitomizes how re-
source constrained its investment stewardship team is: “I cover industrials
and materials in the US and Canada. I cover approximately 800 compa-
nies in those sectors and am responsible for the engagement and proxy
voting with those firms.”38
Besides uninformed voting, it also results in a one-size-fits-all voting
policy. As described by Sean Griffith:
Stewardship groups develop and work from a set of guidelines laying
out a standard approach to recurring governance issues. The voting
guidelines of each of the Big Three, for example, announce voting
positions against staggered boards, poison pills and dual class shares.
These positions lack nuance. In spite of recent research showing that
[these provisions] can create value for some firms, stewardship group
guidelines apply a one-size-fits-all approach to governance . . . .39
Hence, the strategy of mitigating governance risk in the creation of voting
recommendations, whether used by investor stewardship teams or proxy
advisors, is an approach that leads to voting recommendations that are
34. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Insti-
tutional Investors, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2017, at 89, 98.
35. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Govern-
ance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2039 (2019). Bebchuk and
Hirst provide the following example: “We reviewed all of the examples of behind-the-
scenes engagements described in the Big Three Stewardship Reports. We found zero cases
where engagement was described as being motivated by financial underperformance.” Id.
at 2096.
36. BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2020), https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/H856-QL24].
37. Id. at 13–14.
38. Ben Ashwell, How BlackRock Connects the Dots on ESG, CORPORATE SECRE-
TARY (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/esg/32296/how-black-
rock-connects-dots-esg [https://perma.cc/6CSS-865D].
39. Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual
Fund Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. 983, 1001–02 (2020) (citations omitted).
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not very informed or precise, at least in terms of enhancing shareholder
value. 40
This collective action problem also applies to actively managed funds.
In general, it will always be more profitable for them to use their limited
resources to invest in stock valuation, such as fundamental analysis pro-
vided by equity analysts, than to spend their resources on costly high-
value voting recommendations.41 While the benefits of fundamental anal-
ysis will be a private gain for that specific portfolio manager, the benefits
of investing in high-value voting recommendations will be shared by its
competitors.
Of course, there are always exceptions to the rule. For example, “qual-
ity shareholders”42 like Berkshire Hathaway perform detailed up-front
research using fundamental analysis to determine which companies to in-
vest in, and then hold these companies in a relatively concentrated port-
folio for perhaps decades at a time.43 However, their strategy of buy-and-
hold means that they lack incentives for continually making additional
investments in staying informed. Therefore, while informed at purchase,
they may not be so informed as time passes. Also, activist hedge funds—
unregulated hedge funds that take significant stock positions in a particu-
lar company in order to advocate for strategic change prior to selling
their shares—will have strong financial motivations to vote on an in-
formed basis.44 However, similar to quality shareholders, activist hedge
funds only hold a small number of company stocks in their portfolios.
While both quality shareholders and activist hedge funds have roles to
play in the stock market, their respective roles appear small and can be
viewed as forms of arbitrage: one focusing on the short-term45 and the
other on the long-term.46 Therefore, as stated by Jill Fisch, Asaf
Hamdani, and Steven Solomon, “The collective action problem . . . char-
40. But see Jill E. Fisch, Asaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans
of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 47
(2020) (arguing that investment advisers to passive index funds have incentives to be in-
formed when voting).
41. See Bernard S. Sharfman, Enhancing the Value of Shareholder Voting Recommen-
dations, 86 TENN. L. REV. 691, 713–14 (2019).
42. Lawrence Cunningham includes Warren Buffett and his company Berkshire
Hathaway as “quality shareholders.” Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Case for Empowering
Quality Shareholders, 2020 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3547482 [https://perma.cc/6HWZ-LN4L].
43. Id.
44. Edelman et al., supra note 29, at 1379.
45. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1774 (2008).
46. Samuel Lee refers to the investment strategy utilized by quality shareholders as
“time-horizon arbitrage”—that is, “buying assets with long-term value underappreciated
by the market.” Samuel Lee, Warren Buffett and Time-Horizon Arbitrage, MORNINGSTAR
(Nov. 27, 2013), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/620888/warren-buffett-and-
timehorizon-arbitrage [https://perma.cc/2XVH-UUTN]; see also Michael W. Roberge, Jo-
seph C. Flaherty, Robert M. Almeida, Jr. & Andrew C. Boyd, Lengthening the Investment
Time Horizon, MSF (May 2014), http://shareholderforum.com/access/Library/
20140500_MFS.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF7Z-VVRU] (identifying the increasing dispersion
of equity returns over time as a time horizon arbitrage opportunity).
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acterizes all institutional investor engagement in corporate governance—
by both active and passive funds. Costly steps that investors may take to
improve the performance of companies in their portfolio benefit all the
investors that hold shares of these companies.”47
In sum, rational investors are compelled not to invest in being in-
formed when voting because the expected payoff from making such an
investment is simply not adequate.
III. PROXY ADVISORS DO NOT SOLVE THE COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEM
Institutional investors cannot solve their collective action problem
through the use of proxy advisors. This is because the collective action
problem necessarily impacts proxy advisors as well. Proxy advisors must
exist in an environment where their institutional investor clients are only
willing to pay a minimal fee for voting recommendations. This makes
proxy advisors resource constrained. It also explains why institutional in-
vestors are not leading the charge for regulatory reform or demanding
that proxy advisors provide them with better informed and more precise
voting recommendations. In sum, institutional investors simply don’t
want better recommendations if it means having to spend more money.
A. EVIDENCE POINTING TO PROXY ADVISORS BEING RESOURCE
CONSTRAINED
As a result of the collective action problem faced by institutional inves-
tors, it should be expected that proxy advisors are resource constrained.
The evidence appears to bear this out:
There is strong evidence that the two major proxy advisor firms
utilize a low-cost, low-value (not truly informed) approach to the
creation of voting recommendations, leading to imprecise recom-
mendations. This evidence is found in the resources that the two ma-
jor proxy advisor firms, ISS (61% market share) and Glass Lewis
(37% market share), devote to the creation of recommendations. . . .
As of June 2017, the ISS Global Research team covered 40,000
shareholder meetings [approximately 250,000 votes] with approxi-
mately 270 research analysts [an estimated 800 plus votes per analyst
during the proxy season] and 190 data analysts. However, it is not
known how many research analysts are full-time, part-time, or sea-
sonal (proxy season only). . . .
. . . In 2018, Glass Lewis reported that it covers 20,000 meetings
each year with approximately the same number of analysts it had in
2014 [200]. However, it is not known if this number included data as
well as research analysts.
Perhaps the most egregious example of where the lack of re-
sources impacts the precision of a proxy advisor’s voting recommen-
dations is in the critically important areas of proxy contests and
47. Fisch et al., supra note 40, at 35 (citations omitted).
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mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For example, to provide these vot-
ing recommendations, ISS has created a Special Situations Research
Team (Research Team). Remarkably, the Research Team is made up
of only eight analysts. . . .
. . . .
It is extremely doubtful that the expertise required for any particu-
lar proxy contest could be found within the eight-member Research
Team. This is because there are nearly 4000 public companies in the
United States alone, and they exist in numerous industries. For ex-
ample, the Global Industry Classification Standard includes 11 sec-
tors that are further subdivided into 24 industry groups, 69
industries, and 158 sub-industries. In sum, “it would be a rare occa-
sion when the Research Team could find an analyst on staff that
would have the expertise to do an adequate job in evaluating a proxy
contest.”
This lack of expertise would also apply to M&A voting recommen-
dations. . . . On an average annual basis, “approximately 5% of U.S.
public companies delist as a result of M&A activity.” The delist per-
centage may vary, but we will assume that the Research Team has
between 150 to 300 M&A per year. This assumption is several times
larger than the number the Research Team actually deals with in
terms of proxy contests. For an eight-person team lacking the proper
expertise, doing an adequate job of providing voting recommenda-
tions is an impossible task.48
This resource-constrained business environment is further evidenced in
a recent study by Ana Albuquerque, Mary Carter, and Susanna Gallani.
They find that the negative assessments provided by ISS on the executive
compensation of public companies are significantly correlated with poor
future accounting performance.49 However, this only occurs when the as-
sessments are provided during the time of year not associated with the
proxy season:
[E]mpirical evidence show[s] that ISS appears to identify poor com-
pensation practices mainly for the subsample of observations that
have a non-December fiscal year end (FYE). This result suggests
that during the proxy season when ISS is busier (evaluating firms
with December FYE, which represent the majority of ISS’s cover-
age) and more constrained regarding resources needed to analyze
firms’ compensation packages, their recommendations are of lower
quality.50
48. Sharfman, supra note 41, at 713–15 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
49. Ana Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter & Susanna Gallani, Are ISS Recommenda-
tions Informative? Evidence from Assessments of Compensation Practices 30 (Dec. 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3590216
[https://perma.cc/934L-VJXL].
50. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). In the sample used by Albuquerque, Carter, and Gal-
lani, over 70% of the sample firms had a December FYE. Id. This is consistent with the
Conference Board finding that approximately eighty-five of Russell 3000 companies hold
their annual meetings during the first half of the year. MATTEO TONELLO, CONF. BOARD,
PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS (2016–2019) AND 2020 SEASON PREVIEW 14 (2019), https://
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Their empirical results provide evidence that ISS simply does not have
sufficient resources to provide value-enhancing recommendations during
the proxy season, the time of year (March and April) when it creates the
overwhelming majority of its voting recommendations.
In sum, proxy advisors exist in an industry where there is a clear man-
date to produce low-cost, low-value voting recommendations within a re-
source-constrained business environment.51 Combining this result with a
proxy advisory industry that has developed into an oligopoly where there
are only two primary providers of these low-cost voting recommenda-
tions, ISS and Glass Lewis, may result in an excessive amount of con-
formity in voting recommendations.
B. HOW A PROXY ADVISOR DEALS WITH SIGNIFICANT RESOURCE
CONSTRAINTS
Proxy advisors have developed two primary cost-minimizing strategies
to deal with a resource-constrained business environment. The first is cre-
ating voting recommendations based on “mitigating governance risk,”52
and the second is creating broad-based recommendations based on inter-
ested party feedback, including feedback from clients.53 In general, both
strategies help proxy advisors avoid doing any real financial analysis re-
garding a particular shareholder vote and, most importantly, spending the
cclg.rutgers.edu/news/proxy-voting-analytics-2016-2019-and-2020-season-preview/ [https://
perma.cc/HF7K-D632].
51. As observed by Chester Splatt, former Chief Economist of the SEC: “During the
SEC’s roundtable on the proxy process held in November 2018, individual asset managers
focused concern about greater regulation of proxy advisory firms upon the potential impli-
cations for the costs and resulting pricing of their services, rather than the equilibrium
effects on the quality of governance.” CHESTER S. SPLATT, MILKEN INST., PROXY
ADVISORY FIRMS, GOVERNANCE, MARKET FAILURE, AND REGULATION 6 (2019),
https://milkeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/reports-pdf/Proxy%20Advisory%20Firms%20
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/822B-62XV].
52. Statement of Gary Retelny, President & CEO, Institutional S’holder Servs. Inc., to
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., Comm. on Fin. Servs., U.S. House
of Representatives, Legislative Proposals to Enhance Capital Formation, Transparency and
Regulatory Accountability A-14 (May 17, 2016), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/
duediligence/iss-statement-hfsc-17-may-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT2K-YYNK] [herein-
after Retelny House Statement]; Letter from Gary Retelny, President & CEO, Institu-
tional S’holder Servs. Inc., to Bill Huizenga, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Sec.,
& Inv., Comm. on Fin. Servs., U.S. House of Representatives & Carolyn B. Maloney,
Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Sec., & Inv., Comm. On Fin. Servs., U.S.
House of Representatives, Re: July 18, 2017, Hearing Entitled “The Cost of Being a Public
Company in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley and the Federalization of Corporate Governance”
(July 27, 2017), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/duediligence/20170727-iss-letter-to-
hfsc-subcommitee-on-captal-markets-securities-and-investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C8U8-XEEZ].
53. For example, ISS reports that it provides “more than 400 customized voting [re-
ports].” Letter from Gary Retelny, President & CEO, Institutional S’holder Servs. Inc., to
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-09-18/s70918-4184213-172552.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4JW-P9V6]. Glass Lewis
reports that it provides customized reports to a “supermajority” of its clients. GLASS
LEWIS, BEST PRACTICE PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDERS OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING RE-
SEARCH & ANALYSIS: GLASS LEWIS STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE FOR THE PERIOD OF 1
JANUARY 2018 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 2018 at 9 (2019).
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significant resources involved in doing such analysis.54
1. Creating Voting Recommendations Based on Mitigating Governance
Risk
Instead of a proxy advisor investing the necessary resources to produce
voting recommendations that are based on a thorough financial analysis
of each vote, it creates voting recommendations based on corporate gov-
ernance principles that are not fine-tuned to the circumstances of any
individual company. Just like the approach taken by investor stewardship
teams, this “mitigating governance risk” strategy results in a significant
economization of a proxy advisor’s resources. It also results in limited
attention being paid to financial underperformance and a one-size-fits-all
voting policy.
For example, every proxy season ISS produces a benchmark report,
and five additional specialty voting reports, on each public company.55
These reports create a default voting policy for each public company held
in a client’s equity portfolio.56 None of these reports have shareholder
wealth maximization as the exclusive objective of their voting
recommendations.57
Regarding the benchmark report, Gary Retelny, President and Chief
Executive Officer of ISS, has made conflicting statements about its objec-
tive. He has alternatively stated that its objective is “focused solely on
protecting shareholder value and mitigating governance risk”58 while also
stating that its objective is “focused solely on maximizing shareholder
value and mitigating governance risk.”59 These statements sound similar
but actually conflict.60 The first makes clear that a stated objective is not
even the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization but something
lesser, the protection of shareholder value.61 However, it is likely that
what Mr. Retelny meant to say is that the objective of protecting share-
54. These cost-minimizing strategies do not work where some sort of financial analysis
must be applied in a voting recommendation and research report, such as addressing the
desirability of a merger or acquisition. There, as already discussed in this Part, the issue is
the quality of the financial analysis in a resource-constrained environment. See discussion
supra Section III.A.
55. Letter from Neil A. Hansen, Vice President, Inv. Rels. & Corp. Sec’y, Exxon Mo-




57. Id. at 8 n.12.
58. Letter from Gary Retelny, President & CEO, Instutional S’holder Servs. Inc., to
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 53, at 1 (emphasis added);
Retelny House Statement, supra note 52, at A-2.
59. Letter from Gary Retelny, President & CEO, Institutional S’holder Servs. Inc., to
Bill Huizenga, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Sec., & Inv., Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
U.S. House of Representatives & Carolyn B. Maloney, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts., Sec., & Inv., Comm. On Fin. Servs., U.S. House of Representatives, supra
note 52 (emphasis added).
60. See Bernard S. Sharfman, Now is the Time to Designate Proxy Advisors as Fiducia-
ries under ERISA, 25 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 32 (2020).
61. Id.
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holder value, or shareholder wealth maximization, will be achieved
through a strategy of “mitigating governance risk.”62 Such an approach to
voting recommendations makes economic sense when a proxy advisor is
resource constrained.63 That is, instead of a proxy advisor investing the
necessary resources to produce voting recommendations that are based
on a thorough financial analysis of each issue as a means to pursue share-
holder wealth maximization, it takes a short-cut approach by creating vot-
ing recommendations based on corporate governance principles.64 This
resource-constrained strategy may also explain why ISS feels that an
eight-person team of analysts is sufficient to review all the proxy contests
and M&A transactions that come before it on an annual basis.65
Hence, the strategy of mitigating governance risk in the creation of vot-
ing recommendations, whether used by proxy advisors or investor stew-
ardship teams, is a one-size-fits-all approach that leads to voting
recommendations that are not very informed or precise, at least in terms
of enhancing shareholder value.
2. Creating Voting Recommendations Based on Feedback
ISS makes public that, in the development of its benchmark voting pol-
icy, it “collects feedback from a diverse range of market participants
through multiple channels: an annual Policy Survey of institutional inves-
tors and corporate issuers, roundtables with industry groups, and ongoing
feedback during proxy season.”66 Glass Lewis is much more mysterious
in how it goes about using feedback, saying only that it utilizes the advice
of an independent body referred to as the Research Advisory Council.67
The current composition of the Research Advisory Council is extremely
impressive.68 However, it is unknown how the council interacts with
Glass Lewis, what kind of inputs it uses in developing its feedback, or
what kind of feedback it actually provides.
A significant problem with taking a low-cost approach is that, while the
preferences of proxy advisor stakeholders may potentially be revealed
and taken into consideration, the preferences of beneficial investors and




66. Policy Formulation Process, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., https://
www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/policy-formulation-application/ [https://perma.cc/
9FG9-LULR]; see also Press Release, Institutional S’holder Servs., ISS Opens Global Pol-
icy Survey for 2020 (July 22, 2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/iss-opens-global-policy-
survey-for-2020/ [https://perma.cc/F6JD-ZSYV] (noting the use of the survey for purposes
of revising its benchmark voting policies).
67. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-47, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER
MEETINGS: PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRACTICES 23 (Nov. 2016).
68. Currently, David Nierenberg, Charles A. Bowsher, Jesse Fried, Bonnie Hill, Sté-
phanie Lachance, and Katherine Rabin sit on the Research Advisory Council. Leadership:
Research Advisory Council, GLASS LEWIS, https://www.glasslewis.com/leadership-2/ [https:/
/perma.cc/2BTL-9ZKB].
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public pension fund beneficiaries may be ignored. Institutional investors
should be the advocates for their own investors and pension fund benefi-
ciaries, but this may not be the case. For example, investment advisers to
mutual funds and exchange traded funds may want to skew their voting
patterns away from the preferences of baby boomers, the demographic
group still providing the bulk of investment funds, and more toward the
preferences of millennials. Millennials will increasingly be the generation
holding most of the wealth in the U.S., making it essential for investment
advisers to start catering to their needs and developing their loyalty now,
not later.69 As a result, this may mean that these investment advisers will
vote their shares based on a currently perceived preference for less finan-
cial returns and more social activism.70
Moreover, relying on the preferences of proxy advisor stakeholders
will create plenty of room for those with the most influence at a proxy
advisor (i.e. its biggest and best clients) to outweigh others and, therefore,
bias a proxy advisor’s benchmark voting policy with their own prefer-
ences. For example, in its 2019 Global Policy Survey for U.S. companies
ISS “asked investors whether a time-based sunset requirement of no
more than seven years was seen as appropriate” for dual-class share
structures.71 According to ISS, of “those investors who provided a re-
sponse to the question, 55 percent agreed that a maximum seven-year
sunset is appropriate.”72 As a result, ISS changed its benchmark policy
such that “[n]o sunset period of more than seven years from the date of
the IPO will be considered to be reasonable.”73
Besides the problem of how the question was phrased (the question
should have simply been open-ended without leading the investor to a
predetermined maximum number of years), this policy change was based
on the responses of only eighty-nine unidentified institutional investors,74
of which an estimated forty-nine responded yes.75 With an institutional
client base of approximately 2,000,76 this seems to be an incredibly small
sample size to use when making a very important policy change. In addi-
tion, the sample may have been significantly overweighted with repre-
sentatives of investors who support shareholder empowerment, such as
69. Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index
Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 106), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3439516 [https://perma.cc/BDW8-EZZT].
70. See id.
71. Subodh Mishra, ISS Benchmark Policy Updated—Executive Summary, HARV. L.





74. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2019 GLOBAL POLICY SURVEY: SUMMARY OF
RESULTS 27 (2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2019-2020-iss-policy-survey-
results-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2V8-F27F].
75. Id. (estimated).
76. Proxy Voting Services, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., https://www.issgovern
ance.com/solutions/proxy-voting-services/ [https://perma.cc/LZ7T-ZYU7].
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public pension and union-related funds. Moreover, it should be noted
that the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), the trade organization
that represents such funds, has strongly advocated for a seven-year sunset
period.77 Based on these facts, a potential inference is that the question’s
phrasing, and the resulting policy change, was simply meant to please
those clients who espouse shareholder empowerment, such as the CII and
its public pension and union-related fund members.
It should be noted that this is not the first time that the use of feedback
and survey results has been criticized as being opaque and biased. A
number of years ago, David Larcker, Allan McCall, and Brian Tayan
found that (1) “the ISS data collection process relies on a very small num-
ber of participants”; (2) “the composition of the respondent pool that ISS
does reach is not well disclosed”; (3) “the survey suffers from design er-
rors that are likely to confuse and/or bias respondents”; and (4) “it is
unclear how ISS incorporates the feedback that it receives during the
open comment period to finalize voting policies.”78
Finally, it is important to ask why proxy advisors go to such great
lengths to get institutional investor input for their default voting recom-
mendations and why some institutional investors bother to provide it.
One reason may be that it identifies investors who are willing to pay up
for non-wealth maximizing voting recommendations.79 Those who really
care about certain issues want voting recommendations that are consis-
tent with their interests.80 More importantly, for these investors, there is
great value in having a proxy advisor’s one-size-fits-all recommendations
represent their preferences. In that way, their voting power becomes am-
plified.81 Perhaps that is why proxy advisors are so indulgent of institu-
tional investors who advocate for shareholder empowerment by
endorsing proxy access or restricting the use of dual-class shares. It may
also explain why both the CII and public pension funds have, individu-
ally, strongly advocated for maintaining the status quo in the SEC’s ongo-
ing proxy process review.82
In sum, this strategy of using stakeholder preferences, especially client
preferences, may create significant bias in voting recommendations. It
77. Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii.org/dualclass_
stock [https://perma.cc/2W75-LHGG].
78. David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Brian Tayan, And Then a Miracle Happens!:
How Do Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations?, STAN. CLOSER
LOOK SERIES 2–3 (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-
pdf/cgri-closer-look-31-proxy-firms-voting-recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KQ5-
BNTW].
79. John G. Matsusaka & Chong Shu, A Theory of the Proxy Advice Market When
Investors Have Social Goals 14 (Mar. 27, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ss
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3547880 [https://perma.cc/KEQ7-92LY].
80. See id.
81. Id. at 16.
82. See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., and Jeffrey P. Mahoney,
Gen. Couns., Council Institutional Invs., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 15 (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4725-4630831-176413.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34SL-XW54].
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also leads to the conclusion that “proxy advisory firms are concerned that
their voting recommendations reflect the opinions and prejudices of their
clients, the institutional investors; it matters less to proxy firms whether
the governance regime reflected in their voting guidelines is correct.”83
C. A MARKET FAILURE IN THE MARKET FOR VOTING
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the market for voting recommendations there are two parties that
contract with each other: the providers of voting recommendations
(proxy advisors) and their clients (institutional investors). Unfortunately,
the two parties most impacted by the quality of the voting recommenda-
tions—the public companies whose shareholders are being asked to vote
and the beneficial investors of the proxy advisors’ clients––are not parties
to the contract.84
As argued, there is a collective action problem in shareholder voting
that has resulted in a resource-constrained proxy advisory industry and
has created the need for cost-minimizing strategies in the creation of vot-
ing recommendations. These strategies, not based on financial analysis,
lead to voting recommendations that are not adequately informed or pre-
cise. As a result, two significant negative externalities are created.
The first negative externality is the negative impact that uninformed
and inadequately precise voting recommendations will have on the deci-
sion-making of public companies.85 For example, assume an activist
hedge fund is initiating a proxy contest to change the strategic direction
of a company and that the shareholder vote is significantly influenced by
inadequate voting recommendations. As a result, the company’s market
and financial performance will suffer, as well as its ability to successfully
compete against its rivals.
The second externality is the negative impact that such voting recom-
mendations will have on beneficial investors and public pension fund
beneficiaries.86 These investors will suffer economic losses because
suboptimal voting recommendations will lead to value-reducing decisions
83. Bryce C. Tingle, Bad Company! The Assumptions Behind Proxy Advisors’ Voting
Recommendations, 37 DALHOUSIE L.J. 709, 723 (2014). Andrew Tuch also argues that insti-
tutional investors like to work through proxy advisors as a means to implement their own
preferences on shareholder voting because it gives them cover from political reprisal. An-
drew F. Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light, B.U. L. REV. 1459, 1462
(2019). For example, working to implement uniform corporate governance policies through
proxy advisors allows institutional investors to work collectively without triggering regula-
tory oversight by the SEC. Id. at 1496–1500. While beyond the scope of this Article, this
example may have antitrust implications. See generally Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Share-
holding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016); Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal Shareholding
Harms Our Economy—And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 207
(2020).
84. See Bryce C. Tingle, The Agency Cost Case for Regulating Proxy Advisory Firms,
49 U.B.C. L. REV. 725, 746–47 (2016).
85. See id. at 782.
86. See id.
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at public companies.87 For example, the result of a merger vote could be
significantly influenced by imprecise voting recommendations.
This externality makes Commissioner Roisman’s strong rebuke of
those who think only the interests of proxy advisor clients are of concern
in the regulation of proxy advisors understandable:
For example, I have heard that the Commission should not take any
action related to proxy voting advice provided by proxy advisory
firms because “. . . the investors themselves . . . the ones paying for
proxy advice . . . are not asking for protection.” To be clear, in this
context, I do not consider asset managers to be the “investors” that
the SEC is charged to protect. Rather, the investors that I believe
today’s recommendations aim to protect are the ultimate retail inves-
tors, who may have their life savings invested in our stock markets.
These Main Street investors who invest their money in funds are the
ones who will benefit from (or bear the cost of) these advisers’ vot-
ing decisions.88
Without these negative externalities, “market forces rather than regula-
tion [would be] the most appropriate and effective oversight mechanism
for the proxy advisory industry.”89 However, that is not where the indus-
try stands. Even if voting recommendations are tainted with significant
errors in facts, conflicts, or methodological weaknesses, institutional in-
vestors are very happy to purchase and use them. This is another signifi-
cant weakness in shareholder voting, especially when institutional
investors dominate the voting of proxies as they do today.
87. David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, Outsourcing Shareholder
Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 173 (2015) (“These results suggest
that outsourcing voting to proxy advisory firms appears to have the unintended economic
consequence that boards of directors are induced to make choices that decrease share-
holder value.”); David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, Proxy Advisory
Firms and Stock Option Repricing, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 149, 149 (2013) (“Using a compre-
hensive sample of stock option repricings announced between 2004 and 2009, we find that
repricing firms following the restrictive policies of proxy advisors exhibit statistically lower
market reactions to the repricing, lower operating performance, and higher employee turn-
over. These results are consistent with the conclusion that proxy advisory firm recommen-
dations regarding stock option repricings are not value increasing for shareholders.”
(emphasis omitted)); James R. Copland, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The Big Thumb
on the Scale: An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES 6
(May 30, 2018), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/big-thumb-
scale-overview-proxy-advisory-industry [https://perma.cc/WGP8-CNXG] (“The research
literature therefore shows mixed evidence on the degree to which proxy advisory firms
influence firm voting and the impact they have on corporate behavior and shareholder
returns. For the most part, their influence on voting is shown to be—at a minimum—mod-
erate and their influence on corporate behavior and shareholder value is shown to be nega-
tive. Nevertheless, conflicting evidence exists.”).
88. Public Statement, Elad L. Roisman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., State-
ment at the Open Meeting on Commission Guidance and Interpretation Regarding Proxy
Voting and Proxy Voting Advice (Aug. 21, 2019) (alteration in original) (citations omitted),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-roisman-082119 [https://perma.cc/
EW7A-UY5Y].
89. Tingle, supra note 84, at 779 (quoting Letter from Debra L. Sisti, Vice President, &
Martha Carter, Managing Director, Inst. S’holder Servs., to B.C. Sec. Comm’n et al. 15
(Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category2-Comments/
com_20120810_25-401_sistid_carterm.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9KA-K4QU] (Can.)).
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IV. SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION:
THE ASPIRATIONAL OBJECTIVE OF
SHAREHOLDER VOTING
According to Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Chancery Court,
and quoted with approval by the Delaware Supreme Court, “What legiti-
mizes the stockholder vote as a decision-making mechanism is the pre-
mise that stockholders with economic ownership are expressing their
collective view as to whether a particular course of action serves the cor-
porate goal of [shareholder] wealth maximization.”90 What this statement
implies is that courts expect shareholder voting to be done through the
lens of shareholder wealth maximization.91
As I have argued in other writings,92 Vice Chancellor Laster’s state-
ment is consistent with the premise that the overwhelming majority of the
100 million-plus individual retail investors in the United States that invest
in voting stock indirectly through the use of mutual funds and exchange
traded funds,93 as well as the beneficiaries of public pension funds, “sim-
ply want to earn the highest risk adjusted financial return possible.”94
This includes when they vote or have votes cast for them by their invest-
ment advisers or pension fund managers. That is, it is reasonable to pre-
sume that investors “have a uniform interest in maximizing their own
wealth.”95
In addition, “this desire to earn the highest risk-adjusted financial re-
turn possible is also arguably shared by the overwhelming number of so-
cially motivated retail investors who align their investments based on
their moral or social values, even though they give up some risk-adjusted
return in terms of portfolio diversification.”96 This may be the case even
90. Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 178 (Del. Ch. 2010) (emphasis added), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Crown Emak Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d
377 (Del. 2010) (quoting Kurz with approval).
91. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV.
1951, 1954 (2015) (arguing, in a consistent fashion, that “courts have pervasively embraced
the concept that corporate managers should maximize shareholder wealth”).
92. See, e.g., Sharfman, supra note 41, at 700–03.
93. INV. CO. INST., 2018 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 32 (2018), https://
www.ici.org/pdf/2018_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/D49Q-MMMB].
94. George David Banks & Bernard Sharfman, Standing Up for the Retail Investor,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 10, 2018), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/10/standing-up-for-the-retail-investor/ [https://perma.cc/
Z7T9-S5ZP].
95. Griffith, supra note 39, at 1008; see also Paul Brest, Ronald Gilson & Mark Wolf-
son, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social Value, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://ssir.org/up_for_debate/article/how_investors_can_and_cant_create_
social_value [https://perma.cc/ZSA5-2UHH].
96. Bernard S. Sharfman, Commentary: Reforming a Broken System, PENSIONS &
INVS. (Aug. 27, 2018, 1:00 AM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20180827/ONLINE/
180829997/commentary-reforming-a-broken-system [https://perma.cc/2LC2-FR3Z]. Ac-
cording to Paul Brest, Ronald Gilson, and Mark Wolfson:
Socially motivated investors who wish to create social value through their
investments have the much more challenging task of causing an investee
company to increase its socially valuable outputs—for example, by enabling
it to provide additional health care or education to poor people in developing
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if they have the possibility of losing out on the returns generated by those
finite number of high-performing stocks that allow the stock market to
earn returns above Treasury rates.97 They may even “pay higher manage-
ment fees for this customization. That is, these investors are willing to
exclude certain stocks from their portfolios because they find them to be
socially undesirable, but they are still looking for the highest risk-adjusted
return possible given their investment constraints.”98
Finally, with the exception of a minority of funds that publicly disclose
their willingness to sacrifice financial return in exchange for having a so-
cial impact (social funds), the shareholder voting objective of shareholder
wealth maximization is the only way an investment adviser, as an agent
representing the interests of tens, hundreds, thousands, or even millions
of investors,99 can come closest to representing the preferences of their
retail investors or beneficiaries. As stated by Sean Griffith:
[S]hareholder wealth maximization is often posited or assumed not
because it is the highest and best thing for real-life shareholders but
because it is the most that can be assumed about shareholders as a
class. It does not rest upon the results of a poll of shareholder pas-
sions, but rather operates as a kind of lowest common denominator
solution to their inability to coalesce around other objectives. In-
deed, government failures to advance particular social objectives,
frustrating to critics of wealth maximization, may reflect the diver-
gent preferences of the political electorate, but these critics have sup-
plied no reason to suppose that corporate electorates will not have
similarly divergent preferences.100
Therefore, with the exception of funds that specifically state in their dis-
closure documents that the fund is set up to pursue a non-wealth maxi-
mizing objective, an investor should, at the very least, expect that the
objective of an investment fund will be shareholder wealth maximization.
countries, or inducing it not to despoil the environment. Appropriately called
“impact investments,” these investments must lower the cost of capital to the
enterprise compared to ordinary commercial markets, thereby allowing it to
produce more socially valuable outputs or to engage in more socially valua-
ble practices—the criteria for creating social value.
Brest et al., supra note 95.
97. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?, 129 J. FIN.
ECON. 440, 442 (2018). Bessembinder observed that there is a significant amount of posi-
tive skewness in the returns of individual public companies that have made up the stock
market from July 1926 to December 2016. Id. at 440–43. He found that “in terms of life-
time dollar wealth creation, the best-performing 4% of listed companies explain the net
gain for the entire US stock market since 1926, as other stocks collectively matched Trea-
sury bills.” Id. at 440. Wealth creation “refers to accumulated December 2016 value in
excess of the outcome that would have been obtained if the invested capital had earned
one-month Treasury bill returns.” Id. at 454 tbl.5.
98. Sharfman, supra note 96.
99. Vanguard, a global investment company, reports that it has thirty million investors
as of August 31, 2019. Fast Facts About Vanguard, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com
/who-we-are/fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/4PAC-WGW6].
100. Griffith, supra note 39, at 1009–10 (footnotes omitted).
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A. CORPORATE LAW
Corporate law provides no guidance on what the objective of share-
holder voting must be, despite V.C. Laster’s compelling dicta.101 Indeed,
statutory corporate law is silent on this issue. This should not be surpris-
ing as it is consistent with corporate law’s private ordering approach to
corporate governance arrangements. Delaware’s General Corporation
Law enables private ordering by generally providing default, not
mandatory, rules.102
1. Controlling Shareholders
Moreover, corporate law’s fiduciary duties, which are quite extensive
when it comes to the activities of the board of directors, only apply to
shareholders who have a controlling interest in the company and are also
transacting with the corporation.103 For example, fiduciary duties will
generally apply when a controlling shareholder decides that it wants to
buy out the minority shareholders in a self-dealing transaction (referred
to as a freeze-out merger)104 or when a company is sold to a third party
and the controlling shareholder is alleged to have received special bene-
fits relative to minority shareholders.105 In both situations, shareholders
must vote to approve the transaction. If such transactions are challenged
in a post-closing damages suit, the courts will normally apply an entire
fairness standard of review unless the transaction has somehow been
“sanitized” so as to receive the benefit of the business judgment rule.106
Entire fairness is a “court’s most onerous” standard of review.107 The
entire fairness standard requires a review of the result for substantive
fairness, with the burden of proof on the controlling shareholder and the
101. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
102. James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 257, 261 (2015). Although default rules can be modified, “the default rule is tailored
toward what the legislature believes most, but not all, of an organization’s stakeholders
would agree to if contracting were efficient.” Id.; see also Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368,
1381 (Del. 1996) (“At its core, the Delaware General Corporation Law is a broad enabling
act which leaves latitude for substantial private ordering, provided the statutory parame-
ters and judicially imposed principles of fiduciary duty are honored.”).
103. See Amy L. Simmerman & Katharine A. Martin, Controlling-Stockholder Conflicts
and How to Handle Them, 2 PLI CURRENT 593, 595–96 (2018).
104. Id. at 597 (citing In re Books-A-Million, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 11343-VCL, 2016
WL 5874974 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016) (among others)).
105. Id. (citing In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 11202-
VCS, 2017 WL 3568089 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017) (among others)).
106. Recently, the Delaware courts have allowed relief from the entire fairness stan-
dard of review in a freeze out merger if certain conditions are met. Id. at 598–99. In a
freeze out transaction, if the board appoints a special independent committee to negotiate
the transaction on behalf of the minority stockholders and the transaction is approved by
an informed majority of minority stockholders, then the transaction may be given the ben-
efit of the much more lenient business judgment rule. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.,
88 A.3d 635, 645 (Del. 2014). This approach was further extended to all mergers. See, e.g.,
In re Martha Stewart, 2017 WL 3568089, at *2.
107. Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 459 (Del. Ch. 2011). For a gen-
eral discussion of the entire fairness standard of review see Bernard S. Sharfman, The
Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 27, 39–42 (2017).
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board of the corporation it controls.108 According to Lawrence Mitchell,
a review under entire “fairness contemplates a range of values and fiduci-
ary conduct that properly is analyzed within the totality of a transaction’s
circumstances.”109 When this standard of review applies, courts must
“‘consider carefully how the board of directors discharged all of its fiduci-
ary duties with regard to each aspect of the non-bifurcated components of
entire fairness: fair dealing and fair price.’”110 Moreover, “[n]ot even an
honest belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to
establish entire fairness. Rather, the transaction itself must be objectively
fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.”111
Under entire fairness, fair dealing:
[E]mbraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how
the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were
obtained. . . .
. . . Moreover, one possessing superior knowledge may not mislead
any stockholder by use of corporate information to which the latter
is not privy.112
This point may be especially relevant when a controlling shareholder is
entering into a transaction with the corporation.
Fair price “relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed [transaction], including all relevant factors: assets, market
value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the
intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock.”113 The entire fairness
standard of review, while not demanding the highest price possible, is
clearly seeking to make sure that the focus is on getting at least a fair
deal, especially in terms of price, for the corporation and its minority
shareholders.114 As a result, there is a better chance for shareholder
wealth maximization to be achieved. However, there are so few fact pat-
terns where the entire fairness standard will apply to a shareholder vote
because it only applies to a controlling shareholder transacting with the
corporation when a shareholder vote is required. Therefore, its ability to
encourage shareholders to vote with the objective of shareholder wealth
maximization must be considered negligible.
108. See Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1112–13 (Del. Ch. 1999).
109. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 427
(1993).
110. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 97 (Del. 2001) (quoting Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1172 (Del. 1995)).
111. Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006) (emphasis added).
112. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (emphasis added).
113. Encite LLC v. Soni, No. 2476-VCG, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, at *75 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 28, 2011) (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
114. According to the chancery court: “[A]t least in non-fraudulent transactions, price
may be the preponderant consideration . . . . That is, although evidence of fair dealing may
help demonstrate the fairness of the price obtained, what ultimately matters most is that
the price was a fair one.” Id. at *66 (alteration in original).
2020] Risks and Rewards of Shareholder Voting 871
2. Non-Controlling Shareholders
Unlike controlling shareholders, non-controlling shareholders do not
owe fiduciary duties to the company’s other shareholders, and therefore,
they can vote with whatever objective they feel appropriate (or simply
desire), no matter the impact on their fellow shareholders.115 For exam-
ple, if an investor’s objective in shareholder voting is minimizing carbon
emissions of the company, not shareholder wealth maximization, then so
be it. This lack of fiduciary duty supports the fundamental principle that
shareholders have only limited financial liability when they interact with
the corporation.116 That is, they are only liable up to the dollar amount of
their investment in company stock and nothing more.
In sum, even if shareholder wealth maximization was considered under
a fiduciary duty analysis, it would be irrelevant in the context of share-
holder voting by non-controlling shareholders. This is critically important
in the United States where “controlled companies make up only 3.6 per-
cent of S&P 500 and 8.4 percent of the entire Russell 3000.”117 This
means that for the overwhelming majority of U.S. public companies, cor-
porate law does not provide any guidance to shareholders on what the
corporate objective should be when voting their proxies.
B. FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER FEDERAL LAW
According to the publication Pensions & Investments, institutional in-
vestors currently own up to 80% of the market value of U.S. publicly
traded equities,118 compared to approximately 6% in 1950.119 Institu-
tional investors are susceptible to many different types of opportunistic
behaviors and conflicts of interest that may benefit the investment man-
agers or third parties but do not conform to the interests of their benefi-
cial investors or pension fund beneficiaries. For example, a company that
set up a pension plan for their employees will be run by trustees who are
115. See Simmerman & Martin, supra note 103, at 596.
116. See Robert Flannigan, Fiduciary Duties of Shareholders and Directors, 2004 J. BUS.
L. 277, 285 (2004) (“Shareholders do not, as a matter of status, owe fiduciary obligations to
each other or to their corporations. As discussed earlier, the interposition of the corporate
entity between the shareholders and the business had fundamental consequences. The cor-
poration now carried on the business as a principal. For shareholders, that produced their
limited liability, but also negated the mutual fiduciary obligations they would otherwise
have if they had carried on the business together without incorporating.” (footnote
omitted)).
117. Kosmas Papadopoulos, CEO Ownership, Corporate Governance, and Company
Performance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/13/ceo-ownership-corporate-governance-and-com
pany-performance/ [https://perma.cc/G2VS-BY8B].
118. Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS &
INVS. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.pionline.com/article/2017/INTERACTIVE/170/80-of-
equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions [https://perma.cc/5GLV-AV54].
119. MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, CONF. BD., THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22
tbl.10 (2010).
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selected by the company’s management.120 If the plan includes company
stock, it is not too far-fetched to believe that the trustees will vote their
shares in compliance with management’s wishes.121 Similarly, investment
advisers to mutual funds and exchange traded funds who successfully
market their investment management services or investment products to
an employer sponsored retirement plan, and have delegated voting au-
thority, will be reluctant to vote against the interests of company manage-
ment for fear of losing their business.122
In addition, a pension fund sponsored by a labor union may vote its
shares based on how it financially impacts its members instead of trying
to maximize the value of its pension assets.123 That is, “in situations
where they are voting on issues that affect their [members’] jobs or future
as workers in a company, they may well vote in their interests as workers
at the expense of shareholders,” beneficial investors, pension fund benefi-
ciaries, or both.124 For example, an institutional investor with a strong
preference for shareholder empowerment or some component of envi-
ronmental, social, and corporate governance may prioritize that prefer-
ence over the default objective of shareholder wealth maximization.125
Finally, public pension funds’ trustees, who are often politicians or politi-
cal appointees, may vote to maximize their own political ambitions in-
stead of the value of the pension fund.126
120. James D. Cox, Tomas J. Mondino & Randall S. Thomas, Understanding the
(Ir)relevance of Shareholder Votes on M&A Deals, 69 DUKE L.J. 503, 535 (2019).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 535–36; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 34, at 90 (“[T]he agency problems
of institutional investors can be expected to lead them to . . . side excessively with corpo-
rate managers, . . . .”); Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7,
2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204-2, 275.206(4)-6).
123. Cox et al., supra note 120, at 536.
124. Id.
125. Sharfman, supra note 60, at 16–17; see also Bernard S. Sharfman, How the SEC
Can Help Mitigate the “Proactive” Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism, 8 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 15–16 (2019). As stated in that writing:
I cannot overstate the harm caused by an institutional investor adopting a
shareholder empowerment approach to corporate governance. This is partic-
ularly true when it comes to the private ordering of corporate governance
arrangements. Shareholder empowerment is a one-size-fits-all approach and
should not be confused with our traditional understanding of private order-
ing. This understanding assumes that, “observed governance choices are the
result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and manage-
ment.” For example, it may or may not include such corporate governance
arrangements as dual class shares (with or without time-based sunset provi-
sions), staggered boards, or super-majority shareholder voting. That is the
whole point of private ordering and why it has value; it “allows the internal
affairs of each corporation to be tailored to its own attributes and qualities,
including its personnel, culture, maturity as a business, and governance
practices.”
Private ordering that results from shareholder empowerment disregards
what is wealth maximizing for shareholders at each company. I refer to this
phenomenon as the “bastardization of private ordering” or “sub-optimal pri-
vate ordering.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. Cox et al., supra note 120, at 536.
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The potential for opportunistic behavior means that the fiduciary du-
ties of investment advisers and managers should play a very important
role in making sure they do not use their shareholder voting authority to
benefit themselves at the expense of their beneficial investors or pension
fund beneficiaries. However, this has not been the case in practice or in
reality, and fiduciary duties have not been guiding investment advisers
and managers to vote their proxies based on the objective of shareholder
wealth maximization.
1. The Objective of Shareholder Voting Under the Advisers Act
In the United States, investment managers are primarily regulated by
the SEC under the authority of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Ad-
visers Act).127 Investment advisers128 to mutual funds, exchange-traded
funds, and separately managed accounts are typically delegated the au-
thority to vote their clients’ securities.129 Investment advisers manage
30% of all U.S. publicly traded equity securities130—approximately $10.8
trillion of total U.S. equity value (approximately $35.8 trillion as of Octo-
ber 29, 2020).131 Most significantly, based on projections of the historical
trends in the growth of index funds, Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst esti-
mate that the Big Three investment advisers alone will control 34.3% of
S&P 500 (an index made up of the five hundred largest companies listed
on U.S. stock exchanges) votes by 2028 and 40.8% by 2038.132 As for the
Russell 3000 (an index made up of the three thousand largest publicly
held companies incorporated in the U.S.), Bebchuk and Hirst estimate
that the Big Three will control 29.8% of votes in 2028 and 36.7% of votes
in 2038.133
In 2003, with the implementation of the Proxy Voting Rule as promul-
gated under Section 206 of the Advisers Act, the SEC took the position
that an “[investment] adviser is a fiduciary that owes each of its clients
duties of care and loyalty with respect to all services undertaken on the
client’s behalf, including proxy voting.”134 Moreover, “[t]o satisfy its duty
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to b-21.
128. Id. § 80b-2(a)(11) (defining investment adviser).
129. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6586 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204-2, 275.206(4)-6).
130. INV. CO. INST., 2019 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 37 (2019), https://
www.ici.org/pdf/2019_factbook.pdf. [https://perma.cc/6F3E-HFSH].
131. Buffett Indicator: Where Are We with Market Valuations?, GURUFOCUS (Oct. 24,
2020, 3:05 PM), https://www.gurufocus.com/stock-market-valuations.php [https://perma.cc/
X8TP-F5AP].
132. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV.
721, 739–40 (2019).
133. Id.
134. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204-2, 275.206(4)-6) (emphasis added). The fiduciary duties of an invest-
ment adviser were formally recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Securities and Ex-
change Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). As
stated by the Court:
Nor is it necessary in a suit against a fiduciary, which Congress recognized
the investment adviser to be, to establish all the elements required in a suit
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of loyalty, the adviser must cast the proxy votes in a manner consistent
with the best interest of its client and must not subrogate client interests to
its own.”135 In these situations, a fund’s adviser may have an incentive to
support management recommendations to further its business
interests.136
Yet, the SEC has done little to enforce these fiduciary duties. There has
only been one SEC enforcement action under the Proxy Voting Rule: the
action against INTECH.137 There, the registered investment adviser (IN-
TECH) had initially voted its proxies based on an ISS recommendation
platform that was purposely designed to side with management.138 Be-
tween 2003 and 2006, INTECH moved to a different ISS recommenda-
tion platform that followed the voting recommendations of the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-
CIO).139 According to the SEC’s order instituting proceedings, such vot-
ing recommendations intended to “promote a position that is consistent
with the long-term economic best interests of plan members embodied in
the principle of a ‘worker–owner view of value.’”140 Apparently, this ap-
proach was significantly different than the one taken in the original rec-
ommendation platform.
INTECH switched to this new platform in order “to retain and obtain
business from existing and prospective union-affiliated clients.”141 Soon
after, some of INTECH’s original clients started making inquiries regard-
ing the higher number of votes against management on shareholder
proposals.142
INTECH made the switch in voting platforms without having any writ-
ten procedures or policies that addressed material potential conflicts be-
tween INTECH’s interests in seeking more union-affiliated clients and
those of its clients who did not favor the AFL-CIO.143 By doing so, it had
subrogated its client interests to its own—a breach in its fiduciary duty of
against a party to an arm’s-length transaction. Courts have imposed on a
fiduciary an affirmative duty of “utmost good faith, and full and fair disclo-
sure of all material facts,” as well as an affirmative obligation “to employ
reasonable care to avoid misleading” his clients.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
17 (1979) (“As we have previously recognized, § 206 establishes ‘federal fiduciary stan-
dards’ to govern the conduct of investment advisers. Indeed, the Act’s legislative history
leaves no doubt that Congress intended to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
135. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6589 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204-2, 275.206(4)-6) (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. INTECH Inv. Mgt. LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2872, 95 S.E.C.
Docket 2265, 2009 WL 1271173 (May 7, 2009).
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. at *3 n.3 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at *2.
142. Id. at *3.
143. Id. at *4.
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loyalty.144 Therefore, this was a clear violation of the Proxy Voting Rule
and INTECH paid a civil penalty of $300,000.145
What was conspicuously absent from the INTECH enforcement action,
and from any other guidance or regulations proposed or implemented by
the SEC, was any explicit acknowledgment that shareholder wealth max-
imization should be the default objective when an investment adviser
votes its proxies. This lack of acknowledgement by the SEC is extremely
important because “[i]n Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that clients and their shareholders have no
express or implied private right of action under Section 206 of the Advis-
ers Act of 1940.”146 Therefore, “[b]y extension, no private right of action
exists under the Proxy Voting Rule.”147 Since the SEC is the sole enforcer
of the Proxy Voting Rule, its approach of not taking a position on share-
holder voting objectives means that fiduciary duties under the Advisers
Act are essentially irrelevant in keeping investment advisers focused on
their respective objectives, including the default objective of shareholder
wealth maximization.
2. The Objective of Shareholder Voting Under ERISA
The Department of Labor, through its administration of the ERISA,148
also has an important role to play as a securities regulator—especially in
the area of investment management.149 This importance is evidenced by
the fact that over $11 trillion worth of assets150 are held in ERISA “em-
ployee pension benefit plans.”151
Under ERISA, plan managers have a fiduciary duty to vote the shares
over which they have voting authority. This began with the infamous 1988
DOL letter commonly referred to as the “Avon letter.”152 In the letter
the DOL stated, “In general, the fiduciary act of managing plan assets
which are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of proxies
144. Id. at *3.
145. Id. at *6.
146. Sharfman, supra note 125, at 20 (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 12 (1979)).
147. Id.
148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.
149. See Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory
Damage, 92 TUL. L. REV. 339, 340–41 (2017).
150. Marlene Satter, Retirement Assets Hit $29.2T: ICI Report, THINKADVISOR
(Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2018/12/27/retirement-assets-hit-29-2t-ici-re-
port/ [https://perma.cc/5P6D-V2SU] (noting that there is $8.1 trillion in employer-spon-
sored Defined Contribution plans and $3.2 trillion in private-sector Defined Benefit plans).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (“[T]he terms ‘employee pension benefit plan’ and ‘pen-
sion plan’ mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter estab-
lished or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund,
or program— (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of
income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or
beyond . . . .”).
152. Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., to
Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 WL 897696
[hereinafter Avon Letter].
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appurtenant to those shares of stock.”153 That is, the parties responsible
for managing voting stock in pension plans governed by Title I of ERISA
have a fiduciary duty to vote their proxies. This policy “has been affirmed
by the DOL in 1990, 1994, 2008, 2016, and 2018.”154
The fiduciary duty under ERISA is “very similar to what is found
under the common law of trusts.”155 Under ERISA, those who manage
plan assets owe the strictest duties of loyalty and care to their benefi-
ciaries156 and participants.157
Under ERISA’s duty of loyalty, a plan fiduciary shall discharge their
duties with respect to a plan “‘solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries’ and for the ‘exclusive purpose’ of ‘providing benefits’ to
them.”158 The duty of loyalty also requires an exclusive focus on the “‘fi-
nancial benefits’ for the plan beneficiaries.”159 The latter “constrains plan
managers to focus solely on rates of return to help ensure that benefi-
ciaries and participants ultimately receive what they are due, expect or
hope for in terms of private pension benefits.”160 In terms of investing in
equity securities, this is very much a shareholder wealth maximization
approach.
Given these fiduciary duties, how a plan manager is expected to ap-
proach shareholder voting was long ago summarized in the “Avon letter”:
Section 404(a)(1) requires, among other things, that a fiduciary of a
plan act prudently, solely in the interest of the plan’s participants and
beneficiaries, and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and beneficiaries. To act prudently in the voting of prox-
ies (as well as in all other fiduciary matters), a plan fiduciary must
consider those factors which would affect the value of the plan’s in-
vestment. Similarly, the [DOL] has construed the requirements that
a fiduciary act solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purpose
of providing benefits to, participants and beneficiaries as prohibiting
a fiduciary from subordinating the interests of participants and bene-
ficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated objectives.161
153. Id. at *2.
154. Bernard S. Sharfman, Now Is the Time to Designate Proxy Advisors as Fiduciaries
under ERISA, 25 STANFORD J.L., BUS. & FIN. 1, 8 (2019).
155. Id.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (“The term ‘beneficiary’ means a person designated by a par-
ticipant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a
benefit thereunder.”).
157. Id. § 1002(7) (“The term ‘participant’ means any employee or former employee of
an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is or
may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which
covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose benefi-
ciaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.”).
158. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social
Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381,
403 (2020) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)).
159. Id. (quoting Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 421 (2014)).
160. Sharfman, supra note 60, at 14.
161. Avon Letter, supra note 149, at *3 n.4.
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This guidance sounds very much like a shareholder wealth maximization
approach to shareholder voting. Yet, there has been no case law to en-
force this approach. However, a proposed DOL rule has been promul-
gated that does take this approach.162
C. PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2018 Annual Survey of Public
Pensions, over five thousand public state and local pension funds held
approximately $4.3 trillion worth of assets, of which $1.4 trillion were eq-
uity securities.163 The assets of public pension funds are not evenly dis-
tributed. The twenty largest funds held approximately $2.5 trillion in
assets.164
Even though there is significant diversity between states, trustees of
public pension funds have fiduciary duties that closely track what is re-
quired under the common law of trusts. This means that their fiduciary
duties are the same, or very close, to what is required of ERISA plan
managers. Somewhat amazingly, even though ERISA is not applicable to
state and local public pension funds, “many states share, or have even
copied, ERISA’s fiduciary duties to govern their own pension funds,”165
including California, Florida, and New York, among others.166 Therefore,
an argument can be made that these duties would require a shareholder
wealth maximization approach to shareholder voting. But again, there
has been no case law to enforce such an approach.
D. SUMMARY OF PART IV
There is a strong argument to be made that shareholder wealth max-
imization should be the default objective of shareholder voting in a public
company. Yet, this is not what the law requires. Even though there is a
general consensus that investment advisers and plan managers have a fi-
duciary duty to vote all of their proxies unless they have a good reason
not to do so,167 state courts (applying the common law of trusts or corpo-
rate law), the SEC, and the DOL, even though this may change if the
DOL’s proposed rule is finalized and maintained during the next Admin-
162. Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg.
55219 (Sept. 4, 2020).
163. 2018 Annual Survey of Public Pensions: State & Local Tables, U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/econ/aspp/aspp-historical-tables.html
[https://perma.cc/G867-LPWA].
164. Funded Status of the Largest U.S. Public Pension Funds, PENSIONS & INVS. (Feb. 5,
2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20180205/INTERACTIVE/180209925/
funded-status-of-the-largest-u-s-public-pension-funds [https://perma.cc/AA2Y-573G].
165. David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106,
2120 (2014).
166. Id. at 2120 n.50.
167. See Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior:
A Network Theory Perspective, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 236 (“These requirements [the
Avon Letter and the 2003 SEC Proxy Voting Rule], while stopping short of mandating
voting, are a powerful nudge in that direction for all institutions to which they apply.”
(footnote omitted)).
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istration, have declined to provide institutional investors with enforceable
guidance on the fiduciary objective of shareholder voting, let alone re-
quire that shareholder wealth maximization be the default objective. This
means that institutional investors may be tempted to utilize shareholder
voting for their own purposes (enhancing the welfare of the institutional
investor or its managers) and not for maximizing the wealth of its benefi-
cial investors or public pension fund beneficiaries.
V. HOW SHAREHOLDER VOTING PROVIDES VALUE
So far, this Article has painted a very dismal picture of shareholder
voting. Perhaps those scholars of the ‘50s and ‘60s who wanted to get rid
of shareholder voting were on to something?168 Obviously, shareholder
voting is not a very efficient way to make decisions at a public company.
This problem is something that the marketplace for corporate governance
arrangements appears to already reflect. Shareholder voting is rarely
used when it comes to decision-making at a public company. The default
rule under corporate law, whether or not a public company, is that corpo-
rate decision-making is to be left in the hands of those who are the most
informed about the affairs of the company: the board of directors and its
executive management.169 As so well stated by James Cox, Tomas
Mondino, and Randall Thomas:
Corporations are not democratic institutions. In a democracy, power
flows from the voting populace, and it is this body that is then gov-
erned. The populace governs the procedures for selecting candidates
for office so that continued service as its elected representative de-
pends heavily on popular support to be the nominee in the election.
This is not the case with the corporation. By statute, power over cor-
porate affairs is lodged in the corporation’s “governor”—the board
of directors. Importantly, the source of the board’s power and its
legitimacy is derived from the statute and not the shareholders. In
addition, the power is exercised over interested parties, such as non-
voting security holders and labor, who do not vote in the election of
directors. Indeed, the spheres within which shareholders have au-
thority are limited in number and deeply circumscribed. . . . To be
sure, stockholder approval is required for so-called fundamental
transactions, such as mergers and the sale of substantially all of the
company’s assets. However, these transactions must be initiated by
the board of directors, which controls their timing as well as the in-
formation upon which shareholders rely in deciding whether to ap-
prove the matter.170
Moreover, they go on to say:
The genius of business organizations is their efficiency, which in large
measure flows from enabling individuals with very different skills,
experiences, and other endowments to combine with resulting syner-
168. See supra Part I.
169. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 142(a) (2020).
170. Cox et al., supra note 120, at 515–16 (footnotes omitted).
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gies. Business organization law facilitates specialization and, in doing
so, accommodates the unique limitations of owners whose personal
endowment and circumstances justify their status as owners but not
managers of the enterprise.171
Finally, the value of authority—as represented by the board of direc-
tors and executive management—is a major benefit to public companies;
in contrast, shareholders face efficiency issues when they try to involve
themselves in the company’s decision-making. This value of authority is
what Michael Dooley and Stephen Bainbridge consider to be the crown
jewel of corporate governance.172 They have persuasively made their ar-
guments based on Kenneth Arrow’s theory of large organizations:173
Arrow’s [theory] starts out with the basic proposition that “authority
is needed to achieve a coordination of the activities of the members
of the organization.” But, more importantly, centralized authority
enhances organizational efficiency. According to Arrow, efficiency is
created in a large organization because “the centralization of deci-
sion-making, serves to economize on the transmission and handling
of information.”174
That is, “information scattered throughout a large organization must be
both filtered and transmitted to a centralized authority in order for a
large organization to make informed decisions and minimize error in de-
cision-making.”175 Obviously, the centralized authority does need to be
held accountable to some degree. However, the fear is that in the process
of trying to correct errors resulting from irresponsible decisions, “the gen-
uine values of authority” will be destroyed.176 When that occurs, “ac-
countability can be understood to cross over the line to where a new and
competing locus of authority is created—a locus of authority, such as un-
informed shareholders, that does not benefit from the informational ad-
vantages of the original authority.”177 Or, in the context of Goshen and
Squire’s “principal-cost theory,”178 principal costs will greatly outweigh
171. Id. at 517.
172. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW.
461, 487 (1992); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corpo-
rate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 547 (2003).
173. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–70 (1974). Michael
Dooley was the first to make the connection between the work of Kenneth Arrow and the
structure of Delaware corporate law. See Dooley, supra note 172, at 467. Professor Bain-
bridge has adopted Professor Dooley’s application of Arrow’s theory and readily acknowl-
edges the contribution Professor Dooley has made in the development of his director
primacy model. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 85 n.11 (2004) (“I should acknowledge the debt director
primacy owes to Professor Dooley’s so-called ‘Authority Model,’ . . . .”).
174. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 287, 294–95 (2008) (quoting Arrow, supra note 173, at 68–69).
175. Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation
Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 403 (2014).
176. Arrow, supra note 173, at 77–78.
177. Sharfman, supra note 175, at 406.
178. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 767 (2017) (“[E]ach each firm’s optimal
880 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
agency costs when total control costs are minimized.179 This understand-
ing is why Bainbridge has been able to make the bold statement that the
“[p]reservation of managerial discretion should always be the null hy-
pothesis.”180 In sum, one does not want to trample on the value of au-
thority, as represented by the board and executive management, with too
much shareholder decision-making.
A. SHINING THE LIGHT ON SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS
Nevertheless, even with its defects, it can be argued that there is signifi-
cant value in shareholder voting if it is used sparingly and wisely. This is
acceptable not only because one does not want to diminish the value of
authority by implementing too much accountability through shareholder
participation but also because “[t]he necessary conditions for accounta-
bility are supplied by competitive forces in the product market, in the
internal and external markets for managers[,] . . . in the market for corpo-
rate control,”181 and, most recently, through hedge fund activism.182
Moreover, as the author has previously stated:
Shareholder voting, when it happens, has an obvious and very im-
portant impact on a publicly traded company; it shines light on cor-
porate decision-making, moving decision-making away from the
private confines of the boardroom and into the public arena where
the board’s approach on how to proceed can be debated by those
who have the authority to vote. According to Leo Strine, Chief Jus-
tice of the Delaware Supreme Court, shareholder voting, even in its
limited scope, is one of the components of corporate law that en-
courages the board to view decision-making through the lens of
shareholder interests. However, at the same time, shareholder voting
makes corporate decision-making much more unwieldy and poten-
tially subject to the whims of uninformed and/or opportunistic share-
holders. Hence, a good rationale for why shareholders are given
limited opportunities to weigh in and participate in corporate deci-
sion-making.183
The key point in the quotation above is that corporate decision-making
should be made through the lens of shareholder interests. According to
former Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine:
In American corporate law, only stockholders get to elect directors,
vote on corporate transactions and charter amendments, and sue to
enforce the corporation’s compliance with the corporate law and the
directors’ compliance with their fiduciary duties. An unsubtle mind
might believe that this statutory choice to give only stockholders
governance structure minimizes total control costs, which are the sum of principal costs
and agent costs. Principal costs occur when investors exercise control, and agent costs oc-
cur when managers exercise control.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
179. See id. at 771–72.
180. Bainbridge, supra note 173, at 109.
181. Dooley, supra note 172, at 525.
182. Sharfman, supra note 41, at 695.
183. Id. at 697–98 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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these powers might have some bearing on the end those governing a
for-profit corporation must pursue. But regardless of whether that is
so as a matter of law, this allocation of power has a profound effect
as a matter of fact on how directors govern for-profit corporations.
When only one constituency has the power to displace the board, it is
likely that the interests of that constituency will be given primacy.184
The ability of shareholders, and only shareholders, to “sue to enforce
the corporation’s compliance with the corporate law and the directors’
compliance with their fiduciary duties”185 requires directors to focus on
shareholder interests or else find themselves the subject of a shareholder
suit for breach of those duties. According to the Delaware Supreme
Court in North American Catholic Educational Programming Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Gheewalla:
Delaware corporate law provides for a separation of control and
ownership. The directors of Delaware corporations have “the legal
responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit
of its shareholders owners.” Accordingly, fiduciary duties are im-
posed upon the directors to regulate their conduct when they per-
form that function.186
These fiduciary duties of care and loyalty (good faith is subsumed under
the duty of loyalty under Delaware law)187 enforced under corporate law
direct a board to make decisions that promote shareholder interests.188
In a similar manner, corporate law utilizes a limited amount of share-
holder voting as a tool to shine light on shareholder interests and help
realize its shareholder-centric objective. But when voting does occur, it
has significant ramifications for corporate decision-making:
184. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 453–55
(2014) (footnotes omitted). Stephen Bainbridge makes the interesting point that while di-
rectors have fiduciary duties that extend to shareholders, they are not agents of sharehold-
ers such that the law of agency would apply; instead, they are sui generis actors under the
law. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Directors Are Fiduciaries but They Are Not Agents,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2015/08/directors-are-fiduciaries-but-they-are-not-agents.html
[https://perma.cc/NC26-YMHT]; see also United States v. Griswold, 124 F.2d 599, 601 (1st
Cir. 1941) (“The directors of a corporation for profit are ‘fiduciaries’ having power to af-
fect its relations, but they are not agents of the shareholders since they have no duty to
respond to the will of the shareholders as to the details of management.” (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 14 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1933))); Arnold v. Soc’y for
Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539–40 (Del. 1996) (“Directors, in the ordinary course of
their service as directors, do not act as agents of the corporation, . . . . A board of directors,
in fulfilling its fiduciary duty, controls the corporation, not vice versa.” (citations omitted));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“Neither the board of
directors nor an individual director of a business is, as such, an agent of the corporation or
of its members.”).
185. Strine, supra note 184, at 453–54.
186. N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007) (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998)).
187. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
188. See generally Sharfman, supra note 107, at 63–67 (discussing how fiduciary duties
are directed toward satisfying shareholder interests).
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[S]hareholder voting in a public company cannot be looked at as sim-
ply another tool of accountability, i.e., a device to minimize agency
costs or enhance efficiency, such as when shareholders file a direct or
derivative lawsuit [seeking compensatory or injunctive relief from an
alleged breach in a board’s fiduciary duties], initiate a proxy contest,
attempt a hostile takeover, or take significant positions in the com-
pany and then advocate for change (hedge fund activism). When
shareholders vote they are also participating, alongside the board, in
corporate decision-making. That is, they are temporarily transformed
into a locus of corporate authority that rivals the authority of the
board. As co-decision makers, it is critical that shareholders and
those with delegated voting authority, such as mutual fund advisers,
have informed and sufficiently precise voting recommendations at
their disposal . . . .189
While this co-decision-making function is what distinguishes share-
holder voting from the other tools used by corporate law to make sure
the board of directors is focused on the interests of shareholders, its abil-
ity to support this objective, like the other tools, is what gives shareholder
voting its value. The value provided by shareholder voting also applies to
a controlled company. Without shareholder voting, a controlling share-
holder would have no recourse but to file a lawsuit based on a breach of
fiduciary duty in order to get the board to consider its interests as the
controller. Therefore, shareholders in both controlled and non-controlled
public companies can use this tool, no matter how limited its use and
imperfections, to make sure that the decision-making approach of a
board of directors is aligned with their interests.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING
The following discussion focuses on the widely varied implications of
shareholder voting for the corporate governance of public companies.
A. THE SEC’S PROPOSED RULES ON SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
The SEC’s recently finalized rule changes for shareholder proposals
will, according to its own analysis, most likely have the effect of signifi-
cantly reducing the number of shareholder proposals submitted to public
companies.190 However, this is a reasonable reaction to the risks of share-
holder voting. Unfortunately, the more shareholder proposals that are
submitted to a public company, the greater the likelihood more corporate
decision-making will be done through the inefficient corporate govern-
ance mechanism of shareholder voting. Therefore, keeping shareholder
proposals—and potential voting on them—to a minimum must be consid-
189. Sharfman, supra note 41, at 695.
190. See Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act
Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 34-89964 (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/2020/34-89964.pdf; see also Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresh-
olds Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 34-87458, 84 Fed. Reg.
66,502 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019).
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ered desirable. Consistent with this argument, Matsusaka, Ozbas, and Yi
found that the stock market reacted positively when the SEC determined
shareholder proposals could be excluded.191
Perhaps most importantly, the interjection of shareholder voting into
the decision-making of a public company, particularly when the voting is
uninformed and where the objectives of that voting are difficult to ap-
praise, creates significant uncertainty for the board of directors when
planning corporate strategy. If a shareholder presents a proposal for a
shareholder vote, management may try to persuade the shareholder to
withdraw the proposal by agreeing to a sub-optimal, non-wealth maximiz-
ing alternative in order to avoid risking a vote that it might lose. This is
the argument that Matsusaka and Ozbas persuasively made in a recent
paper:
Managers have an incentive to deter proposals from activist share-
holders by adjusting corporate policy; one might conjecture that ex-
ternal pressure leads them to choose policies more appealing to
other shareholders in order to reduce the electoral prospects of ac-
tivist proposals. However, we show that when deterrence occurs, it is
always by moving policy toward the position favored by the activist,
even if this reduces shareholder wealth. Our analysis stresses the
central role of voting uncertainty in determining the value conse-
quences of shareholder rights and proxy access.192
Nickolay Gantchev and Mariassunta Giannetti’s recent work supports
the implementation of this approach. They found that value-destroying
shareholder proposals, typically submitted by high-volume proposal sub-
mitters, may actually go to a vote, receive majority support, and be imple-
mented by management.193 According to Gantchev and Giannetti:
[O]n average the proposals submitted by the most active individual
sponsors seem to be ill-conceived. These proposals receive less vot-
ing support and are less likely to be implemented by management,
191. John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt
Shareholders? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. for L. &
Soc. Sci. Working Paper No. CLASS17-4, Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 17-7,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2881408 [https://perma.cc/
TY78-Z87A]. According to the authors:
During the period 2007–2019, the market reacted positively when the SEC
permitted exclusion, suggesting that investors viewed those proposals as
value-reducing on average. We also find that a company’s stock price drifted
down over time while waiting for an SEC decision, suggesting that chal-
lenged proposals imposed “distraction” costs on companies. . . . Taken to-
gether, the evidence suggests that managers may be serving shareholder
interests in opposing some proposals, and that the no-action letter process
may be helping shareholders by weeding out value-reducing proposals.
Id.
192. John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, A Theory of Shareholder Approval and
Proposal Rights, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 377, 377 (2017) (emphasis added).
193. Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs and Benefits of Share-
holder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism 2 (Euro. Corp. Governance Inst., Fi-
nance Working Paper No. 586/2018, 2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3269378 [https://
perma.cc/UCU8-2FVP].
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but they may nevertheless pass if they end up being supported by a
majority of arguably uniformed shareholders. If they pass with a ma-
jority in the shareholder meeting, proposals by active individual
sponsors trigger sales by informed mutual funds that voted against
them and, arguably as a consequence, negative abnormal returns.194
The fact that some ill-conceived proposals may actually get majority
support and be implemented by management supports the implementa-
tion of a risk-averse strategy as described above. Moreover, manage-
ment’s desire to avoid a shareholder vote is most likely heightened when
certain shareholders find it desirable to use shareholder proposals as bar-
gaining chips in their negotiations with management. For example, Mat-
susaka, Ozbas, and Yi found that labor unions used shareholder
proposals as bargaining chips to extract side payments from
management.195
Finally, without new, up-to-date rules to limit the use of shareholder
proposals, there is also the risk that the current, more lenient rules will
allow the use of shareholder proposals to proliferate. If so, companies will
be compelled to become increasingly reliant on shareholder voting as a
mechanism for corporate decision-making, even though it would be much
more efficient for management to continue making those decisions. As a
result, more sub-optimal corporate decision-making should be expected,
both as a result of shareholder voting and as a tool to avoid such voting.
Therefore, in order to avoid these outcomes, it is desirable that the SEC’s
proposed changes to Rule 14a-8 be implemented.
B. SUBSTITUTING THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE FOR ENTIRE
FAIRNESS IN CORPORATE LAW
Shareholder voting as presented in this Article also has implications for
corporate law. As mentioned in Part IV, certain transactions involving
controlling shareholders are subject to the entire fairness standard of re-
view unless certain procedures were implemented, at which point the
more lenient business judgment rule applies. This application of the busi-
ness judgement rule has expanded quickly, starting in 2014 with Kahn v.
M & F Worldwide Corp.196 In Kahn, the Delaware Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court’s holding that, in a post-closing damages suit in-
volving a freeze out merger transaction, a board may get the benefit of
the business judgment rule if it appointed a special independent commit-
194. Id. (footnote omitted).
195. John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals by Union
Shareholders, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 3215, 3215 (2018) According to the authors:
In contract expiration years compared with nonexpiration years, unions in-
crease their proposal rate by one-fifth, particularly proposals concerning ex-
ecutive compensation. Union proposals made during expiration years are less
likely to be supported by other shareholders or a leading proxy advisor; the
market reacts negatively to union proposals in expiration years; and with-
drawn union proposals are accompanied with higher wage settlements.
Id.
196. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
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tee to negotiate the transaction on behalf of the minority stockholders,
and the transaction was approved by an informed majority of minority
stockholders.197
Kahn was soon followed by Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,
where the court ruled that “when a merger that is not subject to the en-
tire fairness standard of review has been approved by a fully informed,
uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders” the business judge-
ment rule would apply,198 not the “enhanced scrutiny” standard under
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc.199 or Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.200 Most recently, the Court of Chancery in In re Vol-
cano Corp. Stockholder Litigation, applied Corwin to a two-stage merger
involving a tender offer, where a majority of shares had been voluntarily
tendered.201 According to Charles Korsmo, “As a result, class actions
seeking post-closing damages are effectively a dead letter unless the
plaintiff can show a deficiency in disclosure that would render the stock-
holder vote (or decision to tender) uninformed.”202
Delaware’s desire to apply the business judgment rule and respect the
statutory authority of the board is entirely understandable. Trying to fig-
ure out where to draw the line between when the court should apply a
fairness or entire fairness standard of review, or a business judgment rule
standard has been a major concern of the Delaware courts since at least
1927. In Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp.,203 perhaps the first Dela-
ware case where the business judgment rule was applied, the court stated
its basic approach to drawing the line in the context of no-par stock:
It may be impossible to lay down a general rule on this subject, but
we think the discretion of a board of directors in the sale of its no par
value stock should not be interfered with, except for fraud, actual or
constructive, such as improper motive or personal gain or arbitrary
action or conscious disregard of the interests of the corporation and
the rights of its stockholders.204
At first glance, the precautions required by Kahn and Corwin appear
to be sufficient for a board and the controlling shareholder to earn a busi-
ness judgment rule review of the merger. However, the problem with
Delaware’s application is that it is premised on the misunderstanding that
institutional shareholders are informed voters and perhaps, if the dicta of
Vice Chancellor Laster still holds,205 that shareholder voting is only about
shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, this Article concurs with
197. Id. at 645.
198. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306, 312 (Del. 2015).
199. 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
200. 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
201. 143 A.3d 727, 744 (Del. Ch. 2016).
202. Charles R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers, 10 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 55, 58 (2019).
203. 140 A. 264 (Del. 1927). For an in-depth discussion of Bodell, the business judgment
rule, and entire fairness, see Sharfman, supra note 107, at 37–39.
204. Bodell, 140 A. at 267.
205. See supra Part IV.
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Korsmo when he provides as one of his reasons why Kahn and Corwin
were wrongly decided:
And despite the rise in institutional investors, there remains a seri-
ous informational asymmetry between corporate managers and
stockholders. Even a sophisticated activist investor will find it diffi-
cult or impossible to acquire the information—including properly
non-public information—that corporate managers acquire in the
process of their day-to-day work. Even sophisticated institutional in-
vestors are forced to rely, in large part, on the information disclosed
to them by management. In many cases, it would be difficult for
management to fully convey to investors the information required to
accurately value the firm, even if they in good faith wanted to.206
Moreover, he goes on to state:
Though the share of stock held by institutional investors continues
to grow, there is also reason to think that information asymmetries
will worsen in the near future. A large and growing share of institu-
tional investment is in the form of “passive” index funds. Such inves-
tors, who currently hold approximately 30% of U.S. equities, seek to
assemble a diversified portfolio tracking a broad index such as the
S&P 500. They seek to offer a market return and compete by offer-
ing the lowest possible fees to individual investors. As a result, they
expend little or no effort seeking to value the firms they invest in.
While these index funds are certainly “sophisticated” investors in the
sense that they understand the central lesson of modern portfolio
theory—that picking stocks is usually a fool’s errand—they are not
“sophisticated” in the sense of knowing anything about the firms
they invest in.207
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to opine on whether Kahn or
Corwin were incorrectly decided, the arguments presented here do sup-
port one reason why this might be the case. It also makes the point that
this author is most concerned about efficient decision-making in a corpo-
ration, consistent with Goshen and Squire’s principal-cost theory, which
states, “[E]ach each firm’s optimal governance structure minimizes total
control costs, which are the sum of principal costs and agent costs. Princi-
pal costs occur when investors exercise control, and agent costs occur
when managers exercise control.”208
C. WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF PROXY ADVISORS?
If proxy advisors are of generally little or no help in making institu-
tional investors informed, then where should investors go for informed
voting recommendations?
206. Korsmo, supra note 202, at 98 (footnote omitted).
207. Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
208. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, supra note 178, at 770 (emphasis omitted) (foo-
note omitted).
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Fortunately, the board of a public company already provides this
foundational level of information in their own recommendations on
how shareholders should vote.
. . . .
Directors, as well as executive management, are often referred to
as “insiders.” According to Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomov-
sky, “[i]nsiders have access to inside information due to their proxim-
ity to the firm; they also have the knowledge and ability to price and
evaluate this information.”209
According to Korsmo, “Even a sophisticated activist investor will find it
difficult or impossible to acquire the information—including properly
non-public information—that corporate managers acquire in the process
of their day-to-day work.”210 Accordingly, “voting recommendations of
the board, like all of its decisions, take advantage of this inside informa-
tion as well as the expertise of executive management and are [presuma-
bly] generated through the lens of shareholder wealth maximization.”211
As the author has previously noted:
[E]ven with their significant informational and analytical advantages,
it is not guaranteed that the board will be able to deliver the maxi-
mum precision in its voting recommendations. Bias may have a sig-
nificant negative impact on the precision of the board’s
recommendations. First, the board, being so close in proximity to the
firm, may have, at times, difficulty in being objective in its voting
recommendations.
Second, there is also the issue of agency costs (“the economic
losses resulting from managers’ natural incentive to advance their
personal interests even when those interests conflict with the goal of
maximizing their firm’s value”).212
If bias can interfere with the ability of boards to provide precise voting
recommendations, then perhaps the role best played by proxy advisors is
not to provide voting recommendations, which may not be adequately
informed, but rather to provide assessments on how much bias may be
contained in each board’s voting recommendations, and how they impact
the value of a board’s recommendations. This focus on bias would mean a
huge change in the business model of a proxy advisor, but one that may
yield huge returns for institutional investors.
D. QUALITY VOTING VERSUS TENURED VOTING
Some corporate governance scholars have advocated the use of “ten-
ured voting” to solve what they perceive as the problem of “short-term-
209. Sharfman, supra note 41, at 703–04 (citing Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomov-
sky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 722 (2006)).
210. See Korsmo, supra note 202, at 98.
211. Sharfman, supra note 41, at 704.
212. Id. at 705–06 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Goshen & Squire, supra note 180, at
775).
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ism.”213 That is, shareholders who are looking for a quick buck and will
vote accordingly. This is supposedly harmful to shareholders in general.
To solve this issue, “tenured voting” allows shareholders more votes
based on how long they hold the company’s stock.214 However, tenured
voting ignores the problems discussed above: that of institutional share-
holders not being informed and that voting may potentially represent the
preferences of institutional investors, not the preferences of beneficial in-
vestors or pension fund beneficiaries.215
A better option, though not without technical difficulties in its imple-
mentation as well as administrative issues,216 is what Lawrence Cunning-
ham calls “quality voting.”217 Quality voting apportions increased voting
power through modifications to a company’s charter to those sharehold-
ers who show not only longevity in the holding of a company’s shares but
also a concentration of investment in a small number of companies.218
The argument being that longevity and concentration serve as a proxy for
being informed, representing the interests of beneficial shareholders, and
looking out for the long-term interests of the company. The problem, as
previously mentioned in Part II, is that there is no guarantee that quality
voters will remain informed subsequent to their purchase. That is, there is
no incentive if they have a very rigid buy-and-hold strategy.219 However,
if this issue can be worked out, along with the technical and administra-
tive issues discussed in Cunningham’s new article, then perhaps quality
voting can help increase the amount of informed and unbiased recom-
mendations that occur at shareholder meetings.
E. COMPOSITION OF SHAREHOLDERS AND ITS IMPACT ON SHARE
PRICE
A final implication, and one that is decidedly speculative, is that the
greater the composition of shareholders with voting objectives that do
not match shareholder wealth maximization, or are indifferent to that ob-
jective, the more an equity analyst may penalize the company in terms of
valuation, and in turn put downward pressure on the value of the com-
pany’s stock price. For example, an equity analyst may mark down her
estimated value of a firm’s stock when institutional investors are rela-
tively overrepresented and retail investors are underrepresented. This
type of result can be inferred from the recent research of Alon Brav,
Matthew Cain, and Jonathan Zytnick who found that:
Retail shareholders and institutional investors vote substantially dif-
ferently. Retail shareholder support for management proposals is
strongly related to lagged firm stock price performance, even with
213. See Cunningham, supra note 42, at 5, 7.
214. Id. at 49.
215. See id. at 50.
216. Id. at 58–59.
217. Id. at 55.
218. Id. at 56–57.
219. Id. at 10.
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account-firm fixed effects, consistent with a focus on disciplining
poorly-performing firms, whereas the voting of the Big Three institu-
tional investors [Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advi-
sors] is not statistically significantly correlated with recent stock
performance.220
Or perhaps this results when public pension funds with a focus on share-
holder empowerment, not shareholder wealth maximization, are over-
represented in a public company’s investor base.221
VII. CONCLUSION
Shareholder voting is a necessary component of corporate governance.
However, it does have many risks which cannot be ignored. As discussed,
shareholder voting is an inefficient way to make decisions at a public
company because shareholders are generally uninformed and there is po-
tential for institutional investors to vote opportunistically with uncertain
objectives. As argued, such decision-making is the kind that needs to be
kept at a minimum. Therefore, from a global perspective, regulators,
shareholders, and managers should always be extremely wary of any pro-
posal to increase the use of shareholder voting as a decision-making tool.
220. Brav et al., supra note 31.
221. See TRACIE WOIDTKE, MAHNATTAN INST., PUBLIC PENSION FUND ACTIVISM AND
FIRM VALUE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 3 (2015), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/
html/public-pension-fund-activism-and-firm-value-7871.html [https://perma.cc/5XNT-
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